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Editorial on the Research Topic
Personality and Cognition in Economic Decision Making
Recently, psychologists studying cognitive processes and personality have increasingly benefitted
from the wealth of theory, methodology, and decision making paradigms used in economics
and game theory. Similarly, for the economists, personality traits and basic cognitive processes
offer a set of coherent explanatory constructs in economic behavior. Given the debate on
preference invariance and behavioral consistency across contexts and domains, the papers in this
topic shed light on the existence and effect of stable sets of idiosyncratic features on economic
decision-making.
In Waskow et al., PWYW decisions are studied while acquiring FMRI data. Participants buy
music either under a traditional “fixed-price” (FP) condition or under a PWYW mechanism.
The data replicate previous results on the general feasibility of the PWYW mechanism. In the
FP-condition, neural activity in frontal areas during decision-making correlates positively with the
participants’ willingness to pay. No such relationship was observed under PWYW in any neural
structure. Stronger activity of the lingual gyrus was observed during PWYW.
In Proestakis and Brañas-Garza, the authors deal with the degree to which obese people
adjust their own behavior as a result of anticipated discrimination. Consistent with the System
Justification Theory, the study finds that self-identified obese individuals request lower amounts
of money. Self-perceived but not externally reported excessive weight captures the self-weight bias
not only for obese but also for non-obese individuals. This self-weight bias, yielding lower salary
requests, enhances discriminatory behavior against individuals who feel, but may not actually be,
obese and consequently exacerbates the wage gap.
Corgnet et al. studies whether the push for recruiting diligent millennials using criteria such as
cognitive reflection can ultimately hamper the recruitment of creative workers. A positive effect
is observed of fluid intelligence on originality and elaboration measures of divergent creative
thinking. Furthermore, the U-shape relationship between cognitive reflection and fluency and
flexibility measures of divergent creative thinking is inverted. This suggests that thinking too much
may hinder important dimensions of creative thinking. Diligent and creative workers may thus be
rare.
In Zhu et al., event-related potentials were recorded to evaluate brain responses when gambling
for individual self, a close friend (relational self), or a class (collective self).When outcome feedback
was positive, gambling for the individual “self ” evoked a larger reward positivity compared with
gambling for a friend or for the class, while there is no difference between the latter two conditions.
When outcome feedback was negative, no significant effect was found between conditions. These
findings provide direct electrophysiological evidence that the individual self is at the top of the
three-tier hierarchy of the motivational system in the collectivist brain.
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In Shang et al., it is observed that the choice effect is a robust
phenomenon in which even “mere choice,” not including actual
actions could intensify the preference for the self-chosen over
other-chosen objects. Two studies examine the hypothesis. The
results showed that the mere choice effect measured by Implicit
Association Test (IAT) significantly decreased for participants
with lower levels of trait autonomy (Study 1) and when
participants were primed to experience autonomy deprivation
(Study 2).
In Radell et al., a novel computer-based CPP task is developed
in which participants guide an avatar to enter into a room with
frequent (i.e., rich) and less frequent (i.e., poor) rewards. Low IU
individuals enter into both rooms at about the same rate, while
high IU individuals enter into the previously rich room first.
The latter’s attraction to rewards is consistent with previously
observed behavior in opioid-addicted individuals. Thus, high IU
may lead to a cognitive bias favoring increased vulnerability to
addiction.
In Itzkin et al., the participants received six decision scenarios,
in which they were asked to evaluate regret following action
and inaction. Individual regulatory focus was measured by
two scales. Promotion-focused individuals attributed less regret
than prevention-focused individuals to action decisions. Regret
following inaction was not affected by regulatory focus. In
addition, a trigger for change decreases regret following action.
Orthodox people tend to attribute more regret to an action
decision. Thus, both the situation and a decision maker’s
orientation affects regret after action and inaction.
In Ring et al., the performance predictions in the 7-item
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is studied. After completing
the test, subjects predicted their own, other participants’, men’s,
and women’s, correct answers. Men scored higher on the CRT
than women and both men and women were too optimistic
about their own performance. However, men think they perform
significantly better than other men and do so significantly more
than women. The equality between women’s predictions about
their own performance and their female peers cannot be rejected.
In Alós-Ferrer et al., novel evidence is presented on response
times and personality traits in standard questions from the
decision-making literature where responses are relatively slow
(medians around half a minute or above). All questions
create a conflict between an intuitive process and more
deliberative thinking. For CRT questions, the differences in
response times are as predicted by dual-process theories, with
alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses and
neutral questions to slower responses than the original, conflict
questions. For decision biases (where responses are slower),
evidence is mixed.
In Hanaki et al., the authors study the relationships between
the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive
skills, cognitive reflection, and fluid intelligence. Dominance
and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by one’s
fluid intelligence rather than cognitive reflection. Individual
cognitive skills, however, only explain a small fraction of the
observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy of
theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not
only depends on individual cognitive characteristics, but also,
perhaps more importantly, on the decision making environment
itself.
Terzi et al. investigates the capacity of four potential reference
points—(1) population average payoff, (2) announced expected
payoff of peers in similar situations, (3) a historical average of
earnings in the same task, and (4) an announced anticipated
individual payoff—to organize decisions in a risky decision
making task. The population average payoff is the modal
reference point, followed by experimenter’s stated expectation
of individual earnings, followed by average earnings of other
participants. A sizeable share of individuals show multiple
reference points. The reference point is not affected by a shock
to her income.
In Myrseth andWollbrant, the association between “intuitive”
and “fast” (Cappelen et al., 2015) is discussed. The commentary
argues that such an association requires “fast” to rule out
“deliberative,” which would need information beyond relative
response speed. The precise cut-off time for deliberative decisions
may be difficult to establish (see e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977;
Posner and Rothbart, 1998), thus, an individual offered a few
seconds, may still have sufficient time to reflect consciously. Thus,
“faster” responses ought not to be taken as “intuitive” prima facie.
In Breaban et al., an experiment is run to consider the
emotional correlates of prudent decision making. Subjects were
presented with lotteries, while their emotional responses were
recorded with facial recognition software. They had to make
binary choices between risky lotteries that distinguish prudent
from imprudent individuals. They also perform tasks designed
to assess their cognitive ability and a number of personality
characteristics. It is found that a more negative emotional states
correlate with greater prudence. Higher cognitive ability and less
conscientiousness are also associated with greater prudence.
In Bejarano et al., independently reported measures
of subjects’ cognitive capabilities, preferences, and
sociodemographic characteristics relate to behavior in a
real-effort moral dilemma. Rather than simple correlation,
clustering subjects into groups based on behavior in the real-
effort task reveals important systematic differences across groups.
However, the results indicate a need for a more comprehensive
theory explaining how combinations of different individual
characteristics impact behavior.
In Barreda-Tarrazona et al., four different groups of subjects
are created based on subjects’ scores in altruism and reasoning
ability. Subjects play both one-shot (random changing pairs)
and repeated (fixed partners) prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games.
Incentivised beliefs regarding cooperation are elicited, showing
that high altruism leads to optimism about others’ cooperation
and higher cooperation in the first repetitions of PD. Contrary to
the one-shot PD, high reasoning ability increases the probability
of cooperation.
In Wei et al., individual differences are combined with
social influence, revealing the effect of social value orientation
(SVO) and social influence on prosocial behavior in trust and
dictator experiments. In the trust game, prosocials were less
likely than proselfs to conform to other members’ behavior, when
the majority of group members distrusted the trustee. In the
dictator game, prosocial subjects were influenced more by others’
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generous choices than their selfish choices, even if the latter
benefitted them. The results indicate that the effect of social
influence appears to depend on individuals’ SVO.
In Zhao et al., two studies examine individual differences
in two forms of prosociality—generosity and reciprocity—
with respect to two major models of personality, the Big Five
and the HEXACO. Both generosity and positive reciprocity
determine social preferences. Men were more generous when
this was costless and women were more egalitarian overall.
HEXACO honesty–humility predicted dictator, but not
generosity allocations, while irritability and anger predicted
lower generosity, but not dictator allocations. Politeness of Big
Five agreeableness was uniquely and broadly associated with
prosociality across all games.
Zhao et al. examines the association between the Dark Triad of
personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy)
and corruption. The positive relation between the Dark Triad
and bribe-offering or bribe-taking intention was mediated by
the belief in good luck. Therefore, belief in good luck may be
one of the reasons explaining why people with Dark Triad are
more likely to engage in corruption regardless of the potential
outcomes.
Ibáñez et al. studies the association among different sources of
individual differences such as personality, cognitive ability, and
risk attitudes with trust and reciprocity in an incentivized binary
trust game. Trust associates to positive urgency and emotionality
and, specifically, to the extraversion’s warmth facet. Participants
scoring high in psychopathy exhibit increased electrodermal
activity and reduced evoked heart rate deceleration when asked
to decide whether or not to trust. Abstract reasoning and
low disagreeable disinhibition favor reciprocity, while lack of
reciprocity relates with a psychopathic, highly disinhibited, and
impulsive personality.
While the effects of personality and cognition on economic
decisions remain underexplored, the papers contributed in this
topic offer more than a stimulus for further research. The general
message could be that personality and cognitive processes offer
the stable idiosyncratic ground on which individual decisions are
made.
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